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Number of Cases of Crew Impairment ©
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10th April 2008
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by Susan Michaelis
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In 2005, the CAA
advised, ‘The number of events where impairment has been reported has
remained low.’ [104] However, this is actually completely ignoring the
evidence in the UK contaminated air events in the database in Appendix 2
and information in the frequency of events chapter which shows the
complete opposite. The CAA claim ignores the actual data available
combined with the known problem of significant and incomplete under
reporting.
The CAA advised back in 2003 the following conflicting
information that, ‘smoke and fume events is not uncommon: flight deck
events are rare and of low severity; no precursors of an emerging
‘safety of flight risk’.’ [92] The data available in Appendix 2 and
known problem of under and incomplete reporting in no way supports this
statement, even back in 2003.
In 2005 the Government advised in the House of Lords
that the CAA figures involving pilot impairment possibly related to
engine oil and fume events showed there had been 1 and 0 cases of pilot
impairment in 2004 and 2005 respectively. This was clear
misrepresentation of the data available. By looking at Appendix 2 we can
see that there were in fact 22 and 54 cases of pilot impairment during
these years respectively that involved anything that was listed as an
adverse effect that had the potential to distract the pilot from
performing his duties as required.
Perhaps the CAA was confusing the terms impairment and
incapacitation when providing the information to the House of Lords and
listing only those involving incapacitation, while using the term
impairment and thereby downplaying the situation. However, this too was
not the case as in fact in 2004 and 2005 there were 3 and 8 cases of
partial or full incapacitation respectively related to contaminated air.
By looking at just a few examples on the UK
contaminated air database that are on the CAA list for 2004, it can be
seen that the CAA figures of 1 case of pilot impairment was plain
misinformation:
25 January 2004 - A320: MOR 20040455: Strong oil
fumes in cabin and flight deck / Oxygen / LHR-CPH Return to LHR / PAN /
Cabin crew unwell / the Captain noticed marked tingling in arms- extreme
light-headedness and no ability to focus or concentrate (partial
incapacitation). Co-pilot experienced some mild light-headedness /
ground crew smelt fumes minutes after return to LHR / seal failed and
scavenge pipe leaked / various defects found and listed in MOR in detail
– ‘the combination of defects could produce a source of oil fumes which
would enter the gas path and ultimately the aircraft bleeds.’ MOR
understates crew incapacitation degree as Captain affected badly and
Co-pilot slightly with the latter not mentioned in the MOR and the
degree of Captain effects not mentioned.
21 October 2004 - BAe 146: MOR 200409537: Fumes on
2nd sector with 2 cabin crew on oxygen as dizzy and light headed.
Aircraft continued to operate with Captain dizzy and tingling in legs on
4th sector /nothing entered in tech log / ASR and air quality report to
be filed.
3 November 2004 - B757: CAA MOR 200408064: BALPA /
ASR / MOR / Captain and Copilot affected - throat irritation, light
headed and sore eyes and oily taste in mouth / holed air con duct /
engine overfilling ?? / fumes reoccurred on 4 November 2004. Inspection
maintenance done 8 November 2004. Fumes again 16 November 2004 / Captain
still had symptoms next day and skin problems and health problems since.
8 December 2004 - BAe 146: CAA MOR 200408975: ‘Flight
crew incapacitation due to possible air quality problem: P2 felt unwell
(faint and breathless with shaking hands) / 02 given / P1 had headache
with flu symptoms and was in a state of euphoria although successfully
landed the aircraft while operating as single crew. P2 sent to hospital
and P1 suffered headache and flu symptoms for 24hrs. Incident not
entered in aircraft tech log. APU exhaust may have entered air supply.
Subsequent investigation found APU Bay covered in soot as were packs and
ducting.’
In early 2006 it was acknowledged that the, ‘level of
pilot impairment is higher than previously admitted, a fact the CAA has
had to accept.’ [107]
With regard to crew impairment, cabin crew must also be
considered, yet this rarely occurs. Most passengers do not appreciate
that cabin crew are not primarily employed to serve passengers with
meals and refreshments as this is very much their secondary duty. Cabin
crew are an integral part of the safety aspect of commercial aviation.
Cabin crew are trained to deal with all cabin emergencies that include
cabin fires, depressurisations or to evacuate passengers from the
aircraft in an emergency. This vital role that cabin crew play in an
emergency was clearly demonstrated on 2 August 2005. On 2 August 2005,
an extremely well trained cabin crew evacuated all 297 passengers in
under 90 seconds, from an Air France Airbus A340, after it skidded off a
runway at Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto and burst
into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by fire. If cabin crew
are exposed to contaminated air and a similar incident were to occur,
how many lives would be lost by the reduced reaction times and
effectiveness of a crew suffering exposure symptoms and reduced reaction
times. The concerns in relation to being able to safely evacuate an
aircraft in under 90 seconds, as required by law for most commercial jet
aircraft, whilst suffering exposure symptoms from contaminated air
exposure were highlighted by CUPE in 2004. [108]
Flight Safety Aspects of Contaminated Air
References
92. CAA presentation by S. James, SRG BRE Cabin Air
Conference September 2003. Flight deck occurrences from MORs.
104. UK House of Lords written question. Countess of
Mar [HL 1637] 1 November 2005.
107. The Observer Feb 26 2006. ‘Toxic cockpit fumes
that bring danger to the skies.’
108. Comment made by Gerry McCann, H&S Rep for CUPE
in the documentary entitled: Contaminated Air: An Ongoing Health and
Safety Issue. Produced by www.aopis.org in 2004.