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Checklist Ambiguity Boeing and Airbus ©
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10th April 2008
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by Susan Michaelis
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Along with a
complete lack of education, the same arguments that were applied to the
BAe 146 checklist wording regarding fumes whether visible or not,
suspected or positively identified applies to other aircraft types as
well. The words which should have been added to the words ‘Fire or
Smoke’ in emergency checklists, on all aircraft, to deal with
contaminated air events should have been, ‘Suspected Contaminated Air /
Fumes.’ These words have now been introduced on some aircraft types
(even if the significance has not been made clear to crews), but yet
again the national regulators do not seem in a hurry to bring in change
and ensure that all aircraft checklists contain these words. In the
United Kingdom a review in January 2006 of emergency checklists for two
different UK airlines who both operated the Boeing 747-400, both had
differing emphasis. The initial parts of the checklists including the
memory items are as shown in figures 1 and 2.
The Boeing 747-400 checklist for ‘Airline A’ has the
sensible emphasis of, ‘SMOKE FUMES FROM AIR CONDITIONING and SUSPECTED
CONTAMINATED AIR.’ In contrast as of January 2006 the incorrect older
emphasis was still found on the ‘Airline B’ Boeing 747-400, of,
‘SMOKE/FUMES AIR CONDITIONING’ followed by the comment of, ‘Condition: A
concentration of air conditioning smoke/fumes is identified.’ There
could be and in our experience is a major difference in a pilot’s mind
set between the words suspected and identified as the pilots will see
the responsibility for possibly grounding an aircraft due to fumes
resting with themselves. Therefore most pilots would be more willing to
report fumes if they were simply following the checklist which allows
them to ‘suspect’ the air was contaminated rather than having to
positively ‘identify’ something they cannot see. In other words there
could be a greater reluctance to report fumes when required to follow
the checklists with the older emphasis on identification of fumes. Then
again any checklists that still list only smoke and fire are clearly
directing the pilot towards the mind set that fumes do not have to be
reported, which is completely contrary to the actual regulations.
Figure 1: ‘Airline A’ Boeing 747-400 SMOKE FUMES FROM AIR CONDITIONING and SUSPECTED CONTAMINATED AIR CHECKLIST
Ironically, within ‘Airline A’, their Boeing 737-400
emergency checklists had the same emphasis as their B747-400 checklists
but both ‘Airline A’ and another UK airline, ‘Thomson Fly’ still had
checklists with the older emphasis on their Boeing 757s. The Boeing 757
having been plagued by contaminated air problems as can be seen in
Appendix 2.
Figure 2.:’Airline B’ Boeing 747-400 SMOKE/FUMES AIR CONDITIONING Checklist
These key words of, ‘SMOKE FUMES FROM AIR CONDITIONING
and SUSPECTED CONTAMINATED AIR’ are also missing from the aircraft types
with the most reported incidents (based on the UK contaminated air
database shown in Appendix 2 and the UK Civil Aviation Authority MOR
database) such the BAe 146, Embraer Emb-145, Dash 8 Q400 and the Airbus
A320. Despite the CAA FODCOMs clearly stating that putting oxygen masks
on is the very first thing crews should do in the event of suspected
contaminated air, the A320 checklist from ‘Airline A’ in 2005 directs
crews to use oxygen, ‘if required’ and only after numerous other
procedures have been completed. This is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: ‘Airline A’ Airbus A320 Smoke / Fumes / Avionics Smoke Checklist
All these initiatives described may seem to non
aviation people as more than enough steps to get crews to do the job
properly and to take contaminated air events seriously. However, without
education the message and guidance is lost and hence why the problem
still exists. Twenty years of seeing contaminated air as a nuisance and
a problem that has proven very difficult and costly to address is not
easy to overcome. Crews are not told about those who lose their health
due to contaminated air exposure either. If crews had greater awareness
of this it might focus their minds on being more cautious and acting
properly. The failure of the regulator and airlines to undertake the
education process saw many unions take on the educational role which
shows the scale of the problem.
The pilot unions that made some effort to educate its
members are the Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP) in Australia
who led the way, the Independent Pilots Association (IPA) in the UK and
the other UK pilot union BALPA. Union education has involved sending the
AOPIS DVD, entitled – ‘Aircraft Air Contamination, An ongoing Health
& Safety Issue’ to members, as well as leaflets, newsletters and
internet based information. Union education is very limited when faced
with an airline industry pretty much stating an opposite view,
especially on health related matters. Had the regulators, airlines and
unions tackled this together, then the issue may well be resolved today
and passengers and crews would not continue to be exposed. Instead,
flight safety is compromised daily by crews not acting properly when
contaminated air events occur.
Flight Safety Aspects of Contaminated Air